summarize the current state of defamation law on the Internet, given how courts have interpreted the CDA. 9 Finally, Part IV will suggest a new approach to publisher liability for defamation on the Internet. 10 In particular, this essay advocates that defamation liability for ISPs should be based on the common law framework. 11 This approach would make liability based on the amount of control the ISP has over the particular defamatory material. 12 Additionally, this essay articulates why two of Congress's main reasons for enacting § 230 are seriously flawed. First, Congress thought notice-based liability would remove incentives for ISPs to self-regulate, but this essay argues that a) as it stands today, there currently is no incentive to self-regulate, and b) if courts impose a reasonable ISP standard, those entities would be unable to avoid liability by simply turning a cold shoulder to potential defamation. 13 Second, Congress believed that the fear of potential liability would force ISPs to simply remove any possibly defamatory content. This concern is flawed because a) it fails to take into account the fact that some speech -namely, defamatory speech -should be regulated, and b) market forces and online word of mouth will preclude companies from screening too freely.
14 Such an approach would continue to take into account Congress's concerns about ISPs having to police an enormous amount of material, but would also take into account society's interest in redressing individuals who are defamed through the Internet. Further, there is little reason to continue to grant such broad immunity to ISPs given that one of Congress's purposes 9 See infra Part III. 10 See infra Part IV. 11 See infra Part IV.A. 12 See infra Part IV.B. 13 See infra notes 167-171 and accompanying text. 14 See infra notes 171-182 and accompanying text.
when enacting the CDA in 1996 was to promote the development of the Internet, and the Internet has grown immensely since that time. 15 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEFAMATION LAW ON THE INTERNET
Defamation law as it relates to the Internet has changed significantly in the last fifteen years. In the beginning, there was a framework at common law for publisher liability for defamation based on the amount of control over the material the publisher had. 16 The early cases -Cubby and Stratton Oakmont -involving defamation claims against ISPs for publisher liability used this framework in assessing liability. 17 In 1996, though, Congress enacted the CDA, which drastically changed the state of the law in Internet defamation. 18 In post-CDA cases, courts have broadly interpreted the CDA's immunity, even when they do not agree with Congress's policy choice.
19

A. Common Law Framework
At common law, liability for an entity that published or distributed defamatory material is based on a three-part framework. An entity is classified as either a publisher, distributor, or common carrier depending on the amount of control it retains over the defamatory material. 20 The least culpable of the three classifications is a common carrier. A common carrier has no editorial control over the information it carries, such as a telephone company, which has no control over the content of the calls that pass through it. 21 Given a common carrier's lack of editorial control and lack of awareness as to what it is carrying, this "passive conduit" is not liable for the information it transmits from one party to another.
22
On the other end of the liability spectrum -and, likewise, the control spectrum -is a
publisher. An entity classified as a publisher is one that retains substantial editorial control over the information it sends out, such as a newspaper. 23 A newspaper, for example, actively selects what content it will publish and thus should have great ability to notice potentially defamatory material. Since the entity has this amount of control, it is liable under normal defamation standards and can be liable if the claimant shows at least negligence on the publisher's part. 24 Falling in the middle of the liability spectrum are the entities classified as distributors.
Entities falling into this category are often compared to public libraries or bookstores because they have a choice as to what information to carry and thus are not passive conduits like telephone companies, but they do not retain editorial control over the material to the same extent that a newspaper does. 25 To hold a distributor liable a plaintiff must show that the material was defamatory and that the distributor knew or should have reasonably known of the defamatory nature of the work. 26 21 Id. 22 Id. 23 Id. 24 Id. 25 Id. 26 Id.
Thus, the common law framework, which is divided into three categories -common carriers, publishers, and distributors -assesses liability based on the amount of editorial control the entity retains over the defamatory material. As part of its evidence that Prodigy was a publisher, the plaintiffs argued that Prodigy held itself out as a service that exercised editorial control over the content posted on its bulletin boards. 45 Prodigy argued that its policies were different and that it did not retain such control.
46
The court stated that the critical issue to determine was whether Prodigy "exercised sufficient editorial control . . . to render it a publisher with the same responsibilities as a newspaper."
47
The court reviewed Cubby and found two key distinctions. 48 which it was required to follow. 50 The court held that Prodigy made decisions regarding content because it actively deleted notes from its bulletin boards on the basis of their content. 51 Thus, the court concluded that Prodigy was a publisher rather than a distributor.
52
The court further clarified that it agreed with the Cubby court that computer bulletin boards should generally be treated like bookstores and libraries, but it was Prodigy's own policies and choice to exert editorial control that altered the scenario and made them a publisher in this context. 53 Prodigy's choice to exercise editorial control, according to the court, "opened it up to a greater liability than . . . other computer networks that make no such choice."
54
C. § 230 of the Communications Decency Act
After Cubby and Stratton, Congress enacted § 230 of the Communications Decency Act.
In fact, Congress enacted § 230 in large part as a response to those earlier decisions. Subsection (a) of the CDA contains Congress's findings; notably, that the Internet and other computer services represent an "extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources," and that the Internet offers a forum for diversity of political discourse and opportunity for cultural development. 55 Furthermore, Congress found that the Internet will flourish to the benefit of all Americans with minimal government regulation.
56
In subsection (b), Congress made it clear that its policy was to "promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services" and preserve the "vibrant 50 Id. Id. 96 Id. In an oft-quoted passage the court expressed its views about its decision were it not restrained by Congress's enactment of § 230: Because it has the right to exercise editorial control over those with whom it contracts and whose words it disseminates, it would seem only fair to hold AOL to the liability standards applied to a publisher or, at least, like a book store owner or library, to the liability standards applied to a distributor. But Congress has made a different policy choice by providing immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active, even aggressive role in making available content prepared by others. In some sort of tacit quid pro quo arrangement with the service provider community, Congress has conferred immunity from tort liability as an incentive to Internet service providers to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other offensive material, even where the self-policing is unsuccessful or not even attempted. Id. at 51-52. 97 Id. at 52-53. 98 94 N.Y.2d 242, 246-47 (N.Y. 1999). 99 Id. 100 Id. at 247.
The court analyzed the claims against Prodigy under New York common law, rather than § 230. 101 Regarding the emails and bulletin board messages involved in the case, the court compared the situation to the distinction between a telegraph company and a telephone company.
102 Essentially, the court reasoned, a telegraph company knows the content of the messages it passes because its agents take part in the process, whereas a telephone company plays only a passive role. 103 The court held that Prodigy was much more akin to a telephone company and that no one could expect it to monitor the content of its subscribers' emails. Thus, Prodigy was not a publisher in this instance. The online publication of incorrect stock quotes was at issue in Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and
Co. v. America Online Inc. 105 There, the plaintiff claimed that AOL -who contracted with thirdparty companies that provided it stock information -had on three occasions published incorrect information concerning the plaintiff's stock price and share volume. 106 As a result, the plaintiff claimed, it was defamed. 107 The plaintiff conceded that AOL was an "interactive computer service" under § 230, but argued that AOL worked so closely with the third party companies in the creation of the stock information as to make it an "information content provider" and therefore not immune under § 230. The Ninth Circuit went on to hold that Matchmaker qualified for immunity because it was not an information content provider. 115 The court reasoned that just because Matchmaker provided the questions and the framework from which users create their profiles, this alone did not transform it into an information content provider. 116 The court noted that the users had complete control over the selection of content to input into each profile, and that profiles have no content until a user creates it. In Batzel v. Smith, a handyman overheard a person on whose house he was working tell a friend that she was related to a former Nazi politician, and on another occasion the homeowner also told the handyman that she inherited some of the paintings hanging in her home. 118 The handyman had a suspicion that these paintings were stolen during World War II and belonged to the Jewish people. 119 He sent an email to the Museum Security Network ("MSN" or "Network")
website indicating his suspicions.
120
MSN's operator reviewed the message and then published it to the Network listserv and posted it on the Network's website after making some minor changes. 121 The operator generally exercised some editorial discretion in choosing which received emails to post on the listserv and This approach would take into account how much control an ISP has over the content it provides, rather than simply granting blanket immunity to all ISPs. As is discussed below, this approach would also address and resolve the two main concerns Congress had when it enacted § works. 156 There, the court held that AOL was not liable for defamatory material published through its service, even though AOL paid the author for the rights to his column and actively publicized his column to attract new subscribers. 157 The Blumenthal court explicitly stated in its opinion that it would have applied the common law framework to AOL given the amount of control it reserved, but could not do so because of § 230's immunity. 158 In situations such as that in Blumenthal, there is no reason that ISPs and website operators should not be held accountable for the defamatory content they actively select and publish, and, in Blumenthal's case, even publicize.
As a result, the common law framework would best serve the special circumstances that avoid liability by simply turning away from its duties of being cognizant of the content flowing through its website. This added feature to the common law framework would address the concern that notice-based liability will encourage ISPs to close their eyes to possibly defamatory content out of fear that they will incur liability once they have notice of it.
172
Second, proponents and supporters of § 230 fear that a notice-based liability scheme will have "a chilling effect on the freedom of Internet speech." 173 They fear that "[b]ecause service providers would be subject to liability only for the publication of information, and not for its removal, they would have a natural incentive simply to remove messages upon notification, whether the contents were defamatory or not." 174 The conclusion one must draw given this view is that Congress would rather promote speech on the Internet than have ISPs and website operators be cautious about potentially defamatory speech. While free speech is undoubtedly a matter of great public interest and should be protected, Congress should not ignore the compelling competing interest when considering this issue: individuals' interest in not being defamed.
175
The first response to this concern about potential defamation liability is that ISPs and website operators are for-profit businesses, and if they screen too much material they will quickly lose their edge in the Internet marketplace. As courts and scholars have stated, ISPs are incentivized not to over-screen messages because word travels fast, and "a service that removes members' postings without any investigation is likely to get a bad reputation in a community 172 E.g., Friedman & Buono, supra note 148, at 663 (noting that the threat of litigation might discourage ISPs from monitoring their sites because any efforts by an ISP would lead to notice of potentially defamatory material and thus create possible liability. "[C] hilling . . . occurs when defamation law encourages prospective speakers to engage in undue self-censorship to avoid the negative consequences of speaking."). 174 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333. 175 Waldman, supra note 27, at 51 (noting that the courts should not ignore the interests of states in protecting its citizens' reputations).
whose first value is the free flow of information." 176 This consequence of overly-aggressive content screening -the "marketplace force," let's call it -will force ISPs and website operators to take a closer look at potentially defamatory content before simply removing it because of its possibly defamatory nature.
Another response to Congress's and some critics' concern that potential liability will chill
Internet speech is that there is a reason that an individual or entity can be liable for defamation:
"free speech is not an absolute right." 177 Defamation law is premised on the idea that an individual can be liable for damages if he defames another person, even though he generally has First Amendment free speech rights. 178 However, Congress seemingly ignored the individuals' interest in not being defamed when enacting § 230. 179 Thus, the short answer to the fear that potential liability for ISPs might chill or stunt online speech is that not all speech is supposed to pplying full immunity to defamatory speech seems to leave victims both without a way to reduce the amount of defamation on the Internet and without recourse against the perpetrators. As such, full immunity cannot resolve problems associated with defamatory speech."); see also Freiwald, supra note 167, at 633 (noting that the "immunity provision does nothing to address the concerns of future defamation victims; their interests have been completely ignored"); see also Waldman, supra note 27, at 56 ("The near preclusion of recovery under current interpretive maxims seems to overlook the very foundational precepts underlying defamation."). 180 Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1430 (8th Cir. 1989).
completely ignoring individuals' interest in not being defamed. Defamatory speech that injures other individuals' reputations is precisely the type of speech that should be chilled. Such speech should not go unpunished on the Internet -as it currently does under § 230 -solely because
Congress is concerned that some non-defamatory speech will be screened in the process.
Furthermore, defamation law could actually benefit Internet discourse. 181 Not only does defamation law reflect society's interest in protecting individuals' dignity, it helps to make meaningful public discourse possible by exposing the speech that crosses certain boundaries of decency. 182 Potential defamation liability may actually promote speech on the Internet because the fear of being verbally attacked without the opportunity for redress is a disincentive for people to speak their minds on the Internet. 183 Individuals may choose to keep quiet rather than speaking their minds through the Internet because they know that if they are subsequently attacked through speech on the Internet, they will be unable to recover damages from the ISP or website operator. Also, if there is the potential for defamation liability, Internet speech will be more focused and less irrational. As one scholar has noted, "[t]he quality of speech is improved when speakers realize that their speech has consequences." 184 Thus, potential publisher and distributor liability for defamation on the Internet has the potential to actually increase the quality and amount of speech, rather than chill it.
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that ISPs and website operators profit greatly from their online services. On that basis alone, some scholars argue, these entities should be held at least somewhat accountable for their actions, given that there are victims of defamation out there whose reputations and lives are seriously impaired as a result of defamatory material 181 In sum, the CDA should be repealed and courts should apply the common law framework eliminating the free pass those entities currently enjoy. 188 Also, regarding the fear of Congress, some courts and scholars that a notice-based liability for those entities that fall into the middle "distributor" category will encourage no self-regulation, the law should be reworked to include a reasonable ISP standard. This standard will ensure that ISPs self-regulate because if an ISP fails to self-regulate for the purpose of avoiding notice, but a reasonable ISP in the same circumstances would have reviewed that content, the ISP will subject itself to possible liability.
Furthermore, Congress's fear that potential liability will encourage ISPs to remove too much potentially defamatory content and thus chill Internet speech is not without counterargument.
First, ISPs will inherently be cautious about screening too much material because, if they do, the word will spread that they are over-screening and their popularity will shrink. Second, the type of speech that would be screened -potentially defamatory speech -is of a type that should be screened. Individuals' rights in the sanctity of their reputations outweigh individuals' right to free speech in some circumstances, which is why defamation law exists in the first place.
The Internet allows for cheap, fast and far-reaching dissemination of defamatory material and thus facilitates online defamation and the damage it causes. 189 As a result, it is simply unjust to grant near blanket immunity to ISPs and website operators who publish and distribute defamatory material.
188 See Waldman, supra note 27, at 66 ("This balancing is best achieved by employing a system of liability that opens service providers liability for defamatory statements, when the provider has substantively edited the statement, while not opening liability for minor editing, existence as a mere conduit, or electronic-filtering activities."). 189 Freiwald, supra note 167, at 587-88.
B.
Courts Should Apply the Common Law Framework on a Case-by-Case Basis
In this new approach to Internet defamation liability using the three-part common law framework, courts should apply the framework on a case-by-case basis. Providing online encyclopedias, dictionaries, bulletin boards and chat rooms were some of the small number of functions the Internet performed at the time. Indeed, at the time Congress enacted § 230 it is unlikely that it knew that within a few years almost every newspaper and print medium would have a website publishing the same material.
Extending § 230's immunity to a situation like that in Blumenthal v. Drudge exemplifies this problem. 210 In Blumenthal, the situation did not involve defamation arising from one of several thousand third party posts that AOL could not be reasonably expected to screen for defamatory material. Rather, the defamatory content stemmed from an article by a columnist with whom AOL contracted to have on its site, advertised for, and had the right to edit.
211
Congress could not have intended to immunize an ISP that had this level of knowledge of the material it published and the amount of editorial control it had over such material. There is simply no reason that ISPs who exert this type of editorial control and have such knowledge of the content they are publishing should be immune from possible defamation liability that results. was to promote the growth and development of the Internet. 214 Even at the time Congress enacted § 230 some scholars doubted whether such immunity was necessary for the growth of the Internet. 215 Today, though, with the Internet being the giant medium that it is, there is no doubt that Congress's original goal of promoting the growth of the Internet has been met and is no longer a concern. 216 The Internet has become such an important part of our society and our everyday life that there is no doubt that it will continue to grow and flourish as Congress desired.
There is and will continue to be extensive competition and business interest in the Internet so Indeed, ISPs and website operators should no longer be able to benefit from an outdated law that was meant to promote the growth of the Internet. The nature of the Internet has changed drastically since Congress enacted § 230 and yet the law has remained idle. Consequently, the law needs to adapt to the current circumstances of the Internet and enforce accountability on ISPs and website operators when they either retain control over the material they publish or have knowledge of its contents. 217 Congress's fear that the Internet will suffer as a result of this potential liability will be eased because the Internet has changed the way we live, it is here to stay, and the competition for Internet marketplace supremacy will assure that potential liability does not stunt the Internet's growth.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, § 230 of the CDA needs to be amended or repealed. 218 The current problem is that ISPs and website operators have near blanket immunity for defamation stemming from the materials they publish. 219 A better approach is to allow courts to apply the three-part common law framework. 220 Using the common law framework will properly provide differing standards of liability for ISPs and website operators based on the amount of editorial control they have over, or their knowledge of, the defamatory material they publish or otherwise make available.
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The law should also change to include a "reasonable ISP" standard that asks whether an ISP should have had notice of defamatory content, rather than simply whether it actually knew of the 
